Who nominates? Some issues underlying the appointment of judges in South Africa’ by Masengu, Tabeth
WHO NOMINATES JUDGES? SOME ISSUES 
UNDERLYING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA*
Chris Oxtoby
LLB LLM
Senior Researcher, Democratic Governance and Rights Unit, Department of Public 
Law, University of Cape Town (UCT)
Tabeth Masengu
LLB LLM 
Senior Researcher, Democratic Governance and Rights Unit, Department of Public 
Law, UCT 
PhD Fellow at Human Rights Centre, Department of European, Public and International 
Law, University of Ghent 
1 Introduction
This article examines the importance and impact of the process of 
nomination on the appointment of judges in South Africa. The process of 
judicial appointment has changed dramatically following South Africa’s 
transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy. In the pre-constitutional 
era, appointments were made by the state president in cabinet, with little or no 
external input beyond that elicited from a small political and legal elite.1 This 
contributed to the creation of a judiciary that was entirely lacking in diversity 
in terms of demographic representation, social background and professional 
career paths.2 Judges were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of senior 
advocates, and until the early 1990s, were almost exclusively white men.3 This 
system was reformed significantly, first in terms of the Interim Constitution 
of 1993, and then in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“Constitution”). One of the most marked changes was the establishment 
of the Judicial Service Commission (“JSC”) to recommend the appointment 
of judges to the superior courts. A large and diverse body, the JSC includes 
representatives from the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the organised 
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Law and Society Africa conference in Cape Town 
during December 2016, and we are grateful for the feedback from the session.
** We would also like to thank Musa Kika and Rudo Chitapi for their invaluable research assistance in 
preparing this article, and Lauren Gildenhuys for her editorial assistance. 
1 M Wesson & M du Plessis “Fifteen years on: central issues relating to the transformation of the South 
African judiciary” (2008) 24 SAJHR 187 190.
2 A lack of diversity was of course not the only difficulty with the apartheid era judiciary, which was seen 
as generally complicit in the injustice of apartheid. Wesson & Du Plessis Fifteen years on 190-191; Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (1998) 101. 
3 On the date of South Africa’s first democratic election, 27 April 1994, the judiciary comprised of three 
black men, one white woman, and 160 white men. MTK Moerane “The meaning of transformation of the 
judiciary in the new South African context” (2003) 120 SALJ 708 712. For an overview of appointments 
in the pre-constitutional era, see also M Olivier “The Selection and Appointment of Judges” in C Hoexter 
& M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa (2014) 117-120. 
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legal profession and academia.4 This diversity stemmed from the desire to 
make the appointment process more transparent and accountable, and open to 
greater input from bodies like the organised legal profession, and other users 
of the courts.5
The new constitutional system necessitated the creation of a transformed 
and transformative judiciary, as transformation is part and parcel of the 
reconstruction of society. The transformation of the judiciary is a contested 
issue and understood broadly, it includes factors such as the life experiences 
and mindset of prospective judicial officers.6 Transformation of the judiciary 
includes, amongst other definitions, the re-organisation and re-engineering of 
the structures and branches of the judiciary, and a change in the way judges 
do their work.7 With this re-engineering came the need for a change in the 
demographic composition of the judiciary. This type of transformation has 
been a hotly contested topic over the years.8 Significant progress has been 
made in improving the racial composition of the bench, with the composition of 
black judges9 increasing from 1.4% in 1994 to 65% as of July 2016. However, 
gender transformation has long lagged behind, with the representation of 
women on the bench increasing from 1.2% to 36% over the same period.10 
Racial transformation has been a critical aspect of transforming the judiciary 
in the democratic era. However, as Leona Theron J has aptly stated, “it seems 
that gender took the backseat to race”.11 Steady improvements in regard to 
gender transformation have only been visible since 2013, and a number of 
challenges continue to beset women. These challenges are not only faced by 
women in the legal profession who aspire to become judges, but are equally 
encountered by women in the judiciary who seek appointment to higher 
courts.12
A key rationale that has been identified for the creation of the JSC is to 
establish a system of judicial appointment that is more open and independent.13 
One of the ways in which this is achieved is through the JSC’s procedures 
4 See s 178 (1) of the Constitution for the full composition of the JSC.
5 M Olivier & C Hoexter “The Judicial Service Commission” in C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary 
(2014) 155-156.
6 For a thorough analysis of various concepts of transformation in relation to judicial appointments, see C 
Albertyn “Judicial Diversity” in C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary (2014) 245-287.
7 Moerane (2003) SALJ 711.
8 See for example DB Ntsebeza SC “Transformation of the Judiciary: The Role of the Judicial Service 
Commission” (2014) The Fifth Annual Griffiths & Victoria Mxenge Memorial Lecture 4-12, P Hoffman 
“How the JSC selects judges” (15-11-2012) Politicsweb <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-
analysis/how-the-jsc-selects-judges> (accessed 30-08-2017); J Myburgh “The great Constitutional 
Court mystery” (29-08-2008) Politicsweb <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-great-
constitutional-court-mystery> (accessed 30-08-2017). Judicial appointment has also been the subject of 
two major pieces of litigation in Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) 
and Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission 2017 1 SA 367 (SCA). 
9 As legislated, the term “black” refers to people of African, Indian and Coloured descent, as per section 1 
of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003.
10 Statistics provided by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, on file with the authors.
11 JSC interviews for the Constitutional Court of South Africa held on 9 July 2015 at the OR Tambo Southern 
Sun hotel.
12 See T Masengu “It’s a Man’s World: Barriers to Gender Transformation in the South African Judiciary. 
Perspectives from Women Advocates and Attorneys” (2016) 23 International Journal of the Legal 
Profession 305-319.
13 Wesson & Du Plessis Fifteen years on 193.
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specifically requiring input from the organised legal profession. This input 
takes place at the nomination stage, when candidates are being sought for 
judicial vacancies, and at the interview stage, when comments are solicited 
on the suitability of candidates for appointment. The legal profession is not 
the only sector of society that provides comments to the JSC. Civil Society 
Organisations (“CSOs”) and individuals are also encouraged to do so, and have 
done so in the past.14 Having observed the JSC interviews for a considerable 
period of time, however,15 the authors have noted that the submissions from 
the legal profession and legal organisations are of particular importance. 
First, comments from the legal profession are considered to be comments 
from a candidate’s peers, and thus are more influential because they often 
speak to crucial qualities such as the candidate’s work ethic and knowledge of 
the law. Second, if a candidate is vying for a high court position, comments 
from the legal profession on how a candidate performed as an acting judge 
provide the JSC with insight as to whether the candidate is suitable for judicial 
office, based on factors such as demeanour in court, treatment of counsel and 
witnesses, and the ability to control court proceedings.
This article seeks to present and analyse research findings of data 
collated from participant observations of the JSC interviews and candidates’ 
applications— specifically in relation to the nominations process. This is a 
novel contribution to the literature on judicial appointments. We explore the 
impact of nomination by asking three primary questions: 
(a) Does the identity of the nominator of a candidate have any impact on the 
candidate’s chances of appointment?
(b) Do nominators give sufficient attention to demographic transformation 
when making nominations?
(c) What other factors influence nominators’ decisions to nominate a 
candidate? 
To answer these questions, we conducted a survey of the application forms 
of candidates interviewed for positions on the High Court, Labour Court, 
Labour Appeal Court, Competition Appeal Court, and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal by the JSC between October 2010 and October 2016.
The survey includes nominations for leadership positions (such as Judges 
President or Deputy Judges President) on the courts listed above. However, we 
do not analyse the nomination of candidates for positions in the Constitutional 
Court, or for the leadership positions of Chief Justice and Deputy Chief 
Justice, or President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
The reason for this is that the appointment process for these positions is 
significantly different to the process for other judicial appointments.16 These 
differences, in our view, render such appointments too dissimilar from other 
superior court appointments to be a helpful comparison. Furthermore, our 
14 Individual submissions in particular have been enlightening and revealed useful information, including 
information about instances in which a candidate’s integrity has been questioned.
15 Chris Oxtoby since late 2009 and Tabeth Masengu since April 2012.
16 This difference will be discussed in further detail in the text to part 2 below.
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analysis focuses on those candidates who have been nominated and then 
subsequently shortlisted for interview by the JSC. One of the transparency 
gaps in the South African judicial appointments process is that information 
about candidates who have been nominated, but not shortlisted, is not made 
available. Our survey therefore does not take these candidates into account.
Part 2 of this article locates the nomination process within the legal 
framework for judicial appointments in South Africa. We briefly consider the 
comparative position in Kenya and Zimbabwe, in order to contextualise the 
South African situation. These countries are the only other jurisdictions in 
the region that allow public viewing of judicial interviews. This comparative 
perspective is helpful as it provides a general view of the role that the process 
of nomination is meant to play in a judicial appointment process. In part 3, 
we present the results of our analysis of the impact of nominations on judicial 
appointment. We begin by explaining the role of the organised legal profession 
and professional legal organisations in the judicial appointments process, 
including a consideration of the mandate of these organisations insofar as it 
relates to nominations and the transformation of the judiciary. We then analyse 
the data generated by our study, in order to address questions such as which 
organisations or individuals (or groupings of individuals) are the most frequent 
nominators of candidates for judicial office. We also try to ascertain whether 
there is a discernible pattern of some nominators being more successful (that 
is, those that they nominate are ultimately appointed to judicial office) than 
others. Thereafter, we examine the substantive reasons given for nominating 
candidates, with a primary focus on the Black Lawyers Association (“BLA”) 
and the South African Chapter of the International Association of Women 
Judges (“SAC-IAWJ”). In this section, we explore how the nomination of 
candidates for judicial appointment meets the transformative mandate of 
these two organisations and others. 
Finally, in part 4 we specifically focus on the gendered nature of the 
nominations and of the judicial appointment system more generally. In order 
to rectify the current gender imbalances in the judiciary, it is important to 
recognise aspects of the appointments process that may impede women’s 
abilities to be permanently appointed as judges, or promoted within the 
judiciary. What might appear to be a fair and equitable nomination process 
may, upon closer inspection, be substantively unequal. Thus, this section 
examines the complete appointments process through a gender lens. We 
analyse the entire process, from the advertisement of vacancies, to the final 
recommendation of candidates for appointment and answer the question 
of whether the process is equal in both theory and fact. We conclude this 
contribution with a summary of the significance of the information gathered 
from our survey, and our final thoughts on the nominations process.
2  The South African legal framework for nominations for 
judicial appointment 
Before turning to consider the specifics of the nomination procedure, 
a general overview of the process of judicial appointment and selection is 
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necessary. The JSC is a key actor in this process. It consists of a minimum 
of 23 members, rising to 25 when candidates for provincial high courts are 
interviewed. These members comprise three judges, the Minister of Justice, 
four lawyers, one teacher of law, ten members of Parliament (both the upper 
and lower houses are represented)17, and four persons designated by the 
President (who inevitably tend to be practising lawyers). As well as playing a 
key role in the judicial appointments process, the JSC is empowered to advise 
national government on issues relating to the judiciary or the administration of 
justice,18 and plays a central role in judicial discipline, including the removal 
of judges from office.19
The JSC is involved in the appointment of all judges to South Africa’s 
superior courts, with appointments to the magistracy dealt with separately 
by the Magistrates’ Commission. But, as was canvassed in the introduction, 
not all superior court judges are appointed in the same way. The President 
appoints the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice, after consultation with the 
JSC and leaders of political parties represented in the National Assembly. The 
President appoints the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal after consulting the JSC.20 In practice, the President effectively 
nominates these appointees, by advising that he is minded to appoint them 
to these positions, and seeking the input of the prescribed organisations. This 
renders these appointments so different from other judicial appointments that 
we have excluded them from this study. 
For judges of the Constitutional Court, the JSC must send a list of names, 
three more in number than the number of vacancies available, to the President, 
who then makes the appointment after consulting the Chief Justice and the 
leaders of political parties represented in the National Assembly.21 This 
high level of presidential discretion in the appointment process, in our view, 
reduces the potential significance and power of nominating organisations, and 
hence we have excluded candidates for the Constitutional Court from this 
research. However, for other superior court judges, the JSC has a much more 
powerful role to play. These judges are formally appointed by the President, 
but “on the advice of” the JSC22 – a formulation that is accepted as binding the 
President to the advice received from the JSC.23 Therefore, the JSC in effect 
makes such appointments. Candidates are interviewed in public by the JSC, 
after which the commissioners deliberate in private before announcing their 
17 S 178(1)(h) and (i) of the Constitution. With six members designated by the National Assembly, at least 
three of whom must be members of opposition parties; and four permanent delegates designated by the 
National Council of Provinces. 
18 S 178(5) of the Constitution.
19 S 177. See also the detailed procedures for dealing with complaints against judges, set out in sections 7-34 
of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994 (as amended) (“JSC Act”). 
20 S 174(3) of the Constitution.
21 S 174(4)(a). 
22 S 174(6). 
23 Olivier “Selection and Appointment” in C Hoexter & M Olivier The Judiciary 127-128.
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recommendations.24 A majority of its members must support all decisions by 
the JSC.25 
The Constitution makes no provision for how candidates for judicial 
appointment are to find their way before the appointing authorities. The 
regulations governing the JSC’s procedure26 require that the JSC publicly 
announce judicial vacancies, and call for nominations.27 The regulations 
further set out specific requirements for what a nomination must contain,28 
including the requirement that there be a letter of nomination specifically 
identifying the nominator, nominee, and for high court candidates, the 
division of the court to which a candidate is nominated.29 The JSC’s public 
announcement of judicial vacancies specifically ‘invites nominations’ to 
fill vacancies in specified courts, and, following the regulations, provides 
specifically for the material that must be included with a nomination.30 
Accordingly, a candidate’s chance of being appointed as a judge is 
conditional, at an early stage in the proceedings, on finding someone willing 
to nominate them. This point might seem banal, but two interviews during the 
JSC’s April 2016 sitting illustrated how even such an apparently elementary 
requirement can get a candidate into difficulties. The first of these interviews 
was that of Nare Kgomo J, who was a candidate for the position of Deputy 
Judge President of the Limpopo High Court.31 In the course of his interview, 
it emerged that administrative staff members at the Limpopo High Court had 
nominated Kgomo J.32 A commissioner specifically commented that, had 
he not received the nominations of these individuals (who held subordinate 
positions to the judge); he would not have received a nomination.33 The 
reaction of commissioners gave a strong sense of unease about the possibility 
for an abuse of power in such a situation. The second interview was that of 
attorney Magdalena De Klerk, a candidate for appointment to the Limpopo 
High Court.34 During the course of the interview, it transpired that Ms de 
Klerk had applied for the position, rather than being nominated for it. This 
raised questions from commissioners as to whether her candidacy was 
properly before the JSC.35 Ms de Klerk was ultimately not appointed. In light 
24 Reg 2(i) and (k) and 3(i) and (k) of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994: Procedure of 
Commission GN R 423 in GG 7616 of 27-03-2003.
25 S 178(6) of the Constitution.
26 Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994: Procedure of Commission GN R 423 in GG 7616 of 
27-03-2003. 
27 Reg 2(b) deals with Constitutional Court judges and Reg 3(b) with High Court and Supreme Court of 
Appeal judges.
28 Reg 2(c) and 3(c) respectively. 
29 Regs 2(c)(i) and 3(c)(i) respectively. 
30 For example, Judicial Service Commission “Media Announcement: Judicial Vacancies” undated, 
unpublished paper, released ahead of the JSC’s April 2016 sitting (copy on file with authors). 
31 For a transcript of the interview, see “Interview of Judge NF Kgomo” (7-06-2016) Judges Matter <http://
www.judgesmatter.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Limpopo-Deputy-Judge-President-Kgomo.pdf> 
(accessed 15-11-2016).
32 Judges Matter “Interview of Judge N F Kgomo” (07-06-2016) 7.
33 Judges Matter “Interview of Judge N F Kgomo” (07-06-2016) 13.
34 For a transcript of the interview, see “Interview of Ms De Klerk” (7-06-2016) Judges Matter <http://
www.judgesmatter.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Limpopo-Division-of-the-High-Court-De-Klerk.
pdf> (accessed 15-11-2016). 
35 Judges Matter “Interview of Ms De Klerk” (07-06-2016) 3-4.
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of the JSC’s regulations of procedure making reference to nomination and not 
application, it was surprising that Ms de Klerk was even shortlisted.
These interviews highlight an important aspect of the nomination process: 
it provides the JSC with some early form of peer review and ‘quality control’ 
of candidates. However, it should be noted that in many cases, this will be 
limited by the extent of information available about why a candidate has been 
nominated. The fact that no person is prepared to sign off as a nominator 
would obviously speak against a candidate’s suitability for appointment. 
Similarly, as highlighted by Kgomo J’s interview, a nominator who does not 
have significant standing in the legal community, or over whom a candidate 
is seen to be in a position of influence, can hamper a candidate’s prospects of 
appointment.
The operations of the two other African countries that conduct public 
interviews for judicial appointments are also interesting and worth noting 
briefly. The Kenyan appointment process is governed by section 166 of 
the Kenyan Constitution of 2010. Vacancies in the courts are posted in 
the government gazette, and on the Kenyan JSC’s website, and a notice of 
the vacancy is sent to the Law Society of Kenya and any other lawyers’ 
professional associations.36 Unlike the South African process, the vacancies 
are also published in national newspapers. Had Ms de Klerk, referred to in 
the South African example above, been applying for a judicial vacancy in 
Kenya, there would have been no objection to her application. This is because 
the Kenyan system actually requires that candidates apply for vacancies, and 
the governing section states that “each applicant seeking consideration for 
nomination and recommendation” must apply in the prescribed manner.37 
The nomination referred to here is not as we know it in South Africa, but 
rather refers to being nominated by the JSC as a suitable candidate for 
recommendation to the President.38 
Thus, involvement from the public at the application stage is limited, and 
only plays a role in the proceedings after candidates have been shortlisted. The 
public is then called upon to provide the JSC with any information of interest 
regarding the candidates.39 Consequently, while organisations can encourage 
their members to apply, they cannot nominate them, as nominating candidates 
would be considered tantamount to interfering with the independence of the 
JSC.40 The operations of the JSC have often come under the spotlight, and in 
2016 alone, the JSC was the subject of litigation proceedings in three important 
matters. First, the Law Society of Kenya petitioned the High Court seeking 
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a parliamentary amendment to the 
JSC recommendation process.41 Then the Trusted Society of Human Rights 
Alliance and others sought an order declaring the JSC’s short-listing process 
36 Sch 1 s 3 of the Judicial Service Act 1 of 2011 (“Judicial Service Act”).
37 S 4 (2) First Schedule of the Judicial Service Act.
38 Ss 14-16.
39 S 9.
40 Response from Elsye Sainna, Deputy Executive Director, ICJ Kenya in electronic communication on 17 
November 2016.
41 See Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General Petition No. 3 of 2016 eKLR.
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for the positions of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Supreme Court 
vacancies as unconstitutional.42 Finally, the National Commission for Gender 
Equality petitioned the Court to have the appointment of a Supreme Court 
Justice set aside, on the basis that his appointment violated the right to gender 
equality enshrined in the Constitution.43 This litigation bears testament not 
only to the importance of the appointment process in Kenya, but also to the 
role that CSOs are playing in ensuring that the process remains as untainted 
as possible.
In Zimbabwe, as in South Africa, organisations can nominate candidates 
for judicial positions. The fairly new appointment process, including public 
interviews, was ushered in by a new Constitution in 2013.44 In contrast to 
the South African framework, there are no JSC regulations that govern the 
appointment procedure. Section 180 of the Zimbabwean Constitution alone 
governs the appointment of judges. It specifically requires that a position 
is advertised, and both the President and the public are invited to nominate 
candidates.45 The advertisements are widely circulated by the JSC, and in 
addition to being posted on the JSC website,46 the advertisements are placed 
in both public electronic and print media.47 While the South African process 
requires a nomination letter, in Zimbabwe specific nomination forms are 
available at Provincial Magistrates’ Court Centres and at the JSC offices in 
Harare.48 It is interesting to note that the nomination form is very concise, and 
does not require a nominator to provide reasons as to why they are nominating 
a particular candidate. One could speculate that perhaps the JSC wanted to 
encourage more people to nominate potential judges, and requiring the 
nominator to substantiate their reason for nominating a candidate would be 
too tedious. But such an approach does limit the preliminary vetting function 
potentially provided by the South African nominations process. 
Considering the novelty of the Zimbabwean process, problems regarding 
the nomination of candidates are yet to arise.49 Zimbabwean Lawyers for 
Human Rights (“ZLHR”), who have been observing the JSC’s interviews 
since their inception, note that because the process is still new, with only 
five rounds of public interviews having been held to date, few organisations 
have engaged with the process.50 Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting on the 
difference between the Kenyan, Zimbabwean and South African systems, 
42 Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v The Judicial Service Commission Petition No. 314 of 2016 
eKLR.
43 National Gender and Equality Commission v The Judicial Service Commission Petition No. 446 of 2016.
44 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013.
45 S 180(b).
46 The JSC’s website may be found at <http://www.jsc.org.zw>.
47 For instance, see Veritas “Nominations Invited for Supreme & High Court Judicial Vacancies” 
(18-03-2014) The Zimbabwean <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2014/03/nominations-invited-for-
supreme-high/> (accessed 15-11-2016) and Veritas “Zimbabwe Court Watch 5-2014” (17-03-2014) Veritas 
<http://www.veritaszim.net/node/871> (accessed 15-11-2016).
48 South African candidates are required to fill out a specific JSC form, but this is a separate requirement 
from the nominating letter. 
49 Though there is litigation underway regarding the selection process for the Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, 
see Judicial Service Commission v Romeo Zibani SC 41/17.
50 Response from Agnes Muzondo, Senior Project Lawyer at Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) 
in electronic communication with Tabeth Masengu on 17 November 2016.
WHO NOMINATES JUDGES? 547
in the initial stages of the appointment process. Why does the former allow 
candidates to apply, while the latter two countries require that the public or 
president to nominate candidates? 
A requirement for nomination is often indicative of the view that their peers 
should nominate candidates, because they are best suited to assess a potential 
candidate’s ability. In truth, there are cases where self-assessment can be 
deceptive, because it allows one to minimise one’s flaws and accentuate one’s 
strengths – perhaps to a negative extent. For both South Africa and Zimbabwe, a 
clean break from the previous system of appointments influenced by patronage 
was desired. The requirement of nominations for positions is possibly an effort 
to engage the public and the legal profession more effectively, thereby also 
allowing for some sort of peer review. This would be particularly pertinent in 
the South African situation, where a nominator has to provide a motivation 
for why they think someone is a good candidate. The positive aspect of this 
is that it is assumed that those who are nominated at least possess some of 
the criteria for judicial office, and that others have noticed it. The negative 
aspect, however, is that it could lead people to join organisations for the wrong 
reason, because they know an endorsement in the future will be of benefit. 
Furthermore, a system of nomination could also create a form of gatekeeping, 
because the absence of a nomination means one cannot be considered for a 
position. Thus for a candidate like Kgomo J, mentioned above, who believed 
that he was ready to take up a judicial leadership position, the absence of 
a nomination from his peers, perhaps led to the acquiring of a nomination 
from administrative staff – an action which was frowned upon by the JSC. 
Conversely, the Kenyan model’s approach seems to lean towards allowing 
candidates to self-assess. If they believe they are qualified, they are given an 
opportunity to put themselves forward and leave the determination of their 
suitability up to the JSC. 
3 The impact of nominations in South Africa
Under the South African system, it is easy to imagine that it would matter 
who nominates a candidate for judicial appointment. Beyond being merely 
a formal requirement, one would expect that the identity of the nominator 
would, at some level, have an impact on the appointing body. This can be 
either favourable, through providing affirming peer review endorsement, or 
unfavourable, as illustrated by the Kgomo J and Ms De Klerk examples. To 
test this assumption, we conducted a simple numerical analysis to determine 
who nominates candidates for judicial appointment, by examining the 
nomination forms of all candidates interviewed by the JSC between October 
2010 and October 2016, subject to the exclusions previously discussed. We 
investigated whether there are any patterns in the relationship between the 
organisations and individuals who nominate candidates, and whether a 
candidate is ultimately appointed. We further broke down the demographic 
composition of candidates nominated by particular organisations, in order 
to assess whether and to what extent nominators are taking into account 
transformational imperatives in making their nominations. This analysis 
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is undertaken in the context of the stated goals of various organisations in 
relation to the transformation of the judiciary.
3 1  The role of the organised legal profession in the appointments 
process 
The change in the appointments system from the pre-Constitutional to the 
Constitutional system has created a significant role for organisations which 
were previously excluded from the process. Organisations such as the National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers (“NADEL”) and the BLA are represented 
in the structures of the organised legal profession.51 Indeed, the regulations 
governing the JSC’s procedures specifically identify NADEL and the BLA, as 
well as the General Council of the Bar and the Law Society of South Africa, 
as institutions which must be informed about judicial vacancies, and in the 
course of doing so the JSC must call for nominations.52 These organisations 
are also among those to which the shortlist of candidates is specifically 
distributed for comment.53 As was alluded to earlier, in addition to trying 
to ensure broader participation in the appointments process, the Constitution 
specifically enjoins the JSC and other decision makers to take into account 
the need for the judiciary to be broadly reflective of national demographics, 
when recommending appointments.54 The goal of transforming the judiciary 
to better reflect South African society has been a central concern of the JSC 
since the commission was established. It is therefore important to explore how 
this issue is impacted by, and impacts on, the nomination process.
The mandates of several of the organisations identified at the beginning 
of this sub section would suggest that they should be at the forefront of 
nominating candidates in order to address the transformational imperatives 
identified by the Constitution. The BLA identifies the need for the judiciary 
to be independent, transparent, accountable, non-sexist and non-racial.55 
NADEL describes its primary goal as contributing to the development of 
“a legal and judicial system that realises access to justice for disadvantaged 
people and the rule of law”.56 The SAC-IAWJ highlights the importance of 
the transformation of the judiciary, identifying as one of its main objectives: 
“To eradicate the barriers which interfere with the full participation by women in the legal system 
in order to promote and support the advancement of women at all levels of the judiciary so that the 
judiciary reflects the demographics of the society it serves.”57 
51 The BLA and NADEL are constituent members of the Law Society of South Africa: see article 3.1 of 
the Constitution of the Law Society of South Africa. For the role of AFT in the structure of the General 
Council of the Bar, see articles 3(c), 3(e)(ii) and (f) of the Constitution of the General Council of the Bar 
of South Africa. 
52 Reg 3(b) of the Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994: Procedure of Commission GN R 423 in GG 
7616 of 27-03-2003 reg 3(b). 
53 Regs 2(g) and 3(g). 
54 S 174(2) of the Constitution. 
55 E-mail from Mr Lutendo Sigogo, President of the BLA (copy on file with authors). 
56 See KwaZulu-Natal Law Society “National Association of Democratic Lawyers Overview” KZNLS 
(undated) <https://www.lawsoc.co.za/default.asp?sl=&id=1972> (accessed 20-11-2016).
57 S 1.4(vii) of the SAC-IAWJ Constitution. 
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The authors’ observations of the JSC’s public interview process suggest 
that questions raising the issue of which organisations nominate and support 
candidates, and how the organised legal profession in particular views a 
candidate’s suitability for appointment, are becoming more frequent. 
The input of the organised legal profession and related organisations can 
thus play a significant role when candidates are interviewed by the JSC. As 
well as nominating individual candidates, organisations regularly comment on 
the suitability of all shortlisted candidates for appointment. Both positive and 
adverse comments will regularly be put to candidates during the interviews. 
However, the impact of such input is a complex issue to interpret. While adverse 
comments from professional bodies can naturally be harmful to a candidate, 
there are instances of candidates being appointed despite serious criticism of 
their judicial attributes. For example, Mmonoa Teffo, previously an attorney, 
was appointed following the JSC’s sitting in October 2011, notwithstanding 
comments from the Johannesburg Bar Council that she lacked experience 
and was unable to deliver judgments promptly.58 The authors’ perception of 
the mood among commissioners during the interview was that this criticism 
created sympathy for the candidate.
3 2 Numerical analysis 
We analysed the nominations of candidates who were interviewed by the 
JSC between the commission’s sitting in October 2010 and October 2016. 
This constitutes fourteen distinct sittings of the JSC. As explained above, 
we did not include candidates for vacancies on the Constitutional Court, or 
for leadership positions on the Supreme Court of Appeal. We included those 
candidates who had been nominated but then subsequently withdrew their 
candidacy. Since the hypothesis we are testing is whether the identity of a 
nominator is influential in the process of selection and appointment to the 
bench, a situation where a candidate has withdrawn before (or even during) 
their interview remains relevant to the analysis. 
Across the surveyed period, a total of 379 candidates were nominated for 
174 judicial vacancies.59 The letters of nomination were analysed in order 
to determine whether signatories made the nominations in their individual 
capacity, or on behalf of organisations. It must immediately be noted that in 
several instances there are overlaps where candidates have been nominated by 
both organisations and individuals. Our research shows that 317 nominations 
were made by 222 individual nominators,60 who were predominately judges, 
lawyers, or academics. It is apparent from these numbers that most individuals 
do not make many distinct nominations. Indeed, only five individuals have 
made five or more nominations.
58 H McLea “Judge Patel gets the nod” (25-10-2011) The Times <http://www.timeslive.co.za/
politics/2011/10/25/judge-patel-gets-the-nod> (accessed 21-11-2016).
59 In the April 2014 sitting of the JSC, the Labour Appeal Court was listed as having eleven vacancies, but 
only seven candidates were shortlisted. We have therefore counted this data as seven vacancies, since the 
remainder were vacancies that could never have been filled. 
60 By “individual nominator”, we mean a person, rather than an organisation or entity.
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The most frequent individual nominators are as follows:
NOMINATOR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS MADE
Judge Achmat Jappie 7
Advocate GL Grobler SC 6
Advocate N Cassim SC 6
Advocate BR Tokota SC1 5
Advocate AA Gabriel 5
The leading individual nominator, Jappie J, is now the Judge President of 
the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, although none of these nominations were 
made after his elevation to judicial leadership. Advocates make up the largest 
constituency among the individuals who have nominated candidates, with 93 
individual advocates each having nominated at least one candidate. A total of 
145 nominations were made by these advocates. Further, 47 individual judges, 
including retired judges, nominated at least one candidate, with a total of 83 
nominations made. 
In total, 238 nominations were made by 51 organisations. Six of these 
organisations have made ten or more nominations. It is therefore apparent 
that it is far more common for organisations to be repeat nominators than 
is the case with individuals. The most frequent nominators among these 
organisations were as follows:
NOMINATOR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS MADE
BLA 65
NADEL 49
SAC – IAWJ 17
South African Women Lawyers’ 
Association (“SAWLA”) 11
Advocates for Transformation (“AFT”) 10
Association of Regional Magistrates of 
South Africa (“ARMSA”) 10
 In addition to the large number of nominations by individual advocates, 
noted above, individual bar councils or other advocates’ professional 
organisations made some nominations, as follows: 
NOMINATOR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS MADE
Northern Cape Society of Advocates 4
Bhisho Society of Advocates / Bar Council 4
Johannesburg Society of Advocates 32
Port Elizabeth Society of Advocates 1
Mthatha Society of Advocates 1
Transkei Society of Advocates 1
Thohoyandou Society of Advocates 1
Free State Society of Advocates 1
 Again, the diffuse nature of the nominations is striking, with only three bar 
organisations having nominated more than a single candidate. However, what 
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is perhaps most noteworthy is that the umbrella governance organisation of 
the advocates’ profession, the General Council of the Bar, has not nominated 
any candidates. This may be explained, at least in part, by practical difficulties 
in coordinating such a process at a national level. 
A similar pattern is discernible in the attorneys’ profession. The Law 
Society of South Africa, the umbrella national body representing the attorneys’ 
profession, made no nominations. Constituent law societies and associations 
of attorneys have made a small number of nominations, as follows:
NOMINATOR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS MADE
Butterworth Region Attorneys’ Association 2
Cape Law Society 2
East London and Mdantsane Attorneys’ 
Association 2
Transkei Attorneys’ Association 2
Grahamstown Attorneys’ Association 1
Many attorneys’ firms have made nominations, although again the 
nominations are very diffuse. With the exception of Honey Attorneys, who 
have made two nominations, none of the other fourteen law firms to have 
made nominations have done so more than once. 
In looking at nominations made by attorneys and advocates, it is necessary 
to remember that organisations like the BLA and NADEL, who feature 
prominently on the list of regular nominators, comprise both attorneys and 
advocates. Indeed, the BLA and NADEL are constituent members of the Law 
Society of South Africa.61 But it is interesting to note that it is organisations 
like the BLA and NADEL that appear to be engaging far more extensively with 
the nomination of prospective judges than those organisations which might 
be considered the ‘traditional’ governance structures of the legal profession. 
This suggests the possibility that those organisations that are most involved 
in nominations are galvanised to do so by the need to transform the judiciary. 
We examine this question more fully in part 3 3 below. 
Efforts to transform the demographic composition of the judiciary have 
forced a broadening of the pool from which judges were traditionally selected. 
Magistrates have increasingly begun to be tapped as potential judges. It is thus 
not surprising to see two magistrates’ organisations featuring prominently 
among the list of nominating organisations. In addition to the Association 
of Regional Magistrates (ARMSA), listed on the above table as having 
nominated ten candidates, the Judicial Officers Association of South Africa 
(“JOASA”) has nominated six.
What rate of success do the nominators have? It would be difficult for us 
to claim that there is a causal link between identifying the nominator, and 
whether or not a candidate is appointed. As the JSC deliberates in private, 
and as reasons for appointment are seldom made public, such a link would 
be difficult to establish definitively. Nevertheless, we are interested to see 
61 See the text to part 3 1 above.
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whether the data might suggest that some nominators are more successful 
than others, and thus whether the source of nomination appears to make a 
difference to a candidate’s chances of success.
Among individual nominators, the number of successful nominations are:
NOMINATOR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS SUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS
Judge Achmat Jappie 7 4
Advocate GL Grobler SC 6 2
Advocate N Cassim SC 6 2
Advocate BR Tokota SC 5 4
Advocate AA Gabriel 5 3
Whilst Jappie J, Advocate Gabriel and particularly Advocate Tokota have 
high ratios of nominated candidates being appointed, the relatively low number 
of nominations made (certainly compared to the number of nominations made 
by leading organisational nominators) makes us hesitant to draw too firm a 
conclusion about the impact of their nominations. Their relative success must 
also be balanced against the lower success rates of Advocates Grobler and 
Cassim. 
To test the hypothesis further, we can compare the collective success rates 
of advocates and judges. One might expect that nominations by judges would 
carry particular weight. Judges are intimately familiar with the demands of 
the judicial office, and one would anticipate that this form of effective peer 
review would be given added weight by the JSC. Advocates, as regular users 
of the superior courts, might also be expected to have their nominations carry 
additional weight.
Do the numbers bear this expectation out? Of the 83 nominations made 
by judges, 36 (43%) have been successful. Even allowing for instances of 
duplication (where multiple judges nominated the same candidate), this is a 
significantly lower success rate than what we would have expected. It might 
be argued that this is a healthy sign that the JSC is not rubber-stamping 
nominations from existing or recently retired judges. If this were the case, 
it would become apparent that the constitutional appointments system fails 
to provide the diversity of input into the process of judicial appointment that 
it was intended to. This might raise concerns that the judiciary is in effect 
regulating its own membership. On the other hand, those concerned about 
the abilities of those appointed to the bench would likely argue that the views 
of judges, as evidenced by their nomination of candidates, ought to be given 
greater weight.
Among advocates, 61 of the 145 nominations made were successful (42%). 
As is the case with nominations by judges, this is a lower percentage than 
what might have been expected, and casts some doubt over whether, or at least 
to what extent, the hypothesis that it matters who nominates a prospective 
judge is correct. 
Among the leading organisations to have made nominations, the number of 
successful nominations are:
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NOMINATOR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS SUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS
BLA 65 23
NADEL 49 19
SAC – IAWJ 17 7
SAWLA 11 5
AFT 10 4
ARMSA 10 2
It is striking that not one of the organisations listed has a percentage of 
successful nominations that exceeds 45%, and that across the most frequent 
nominators overall, candidates’ numerical chances of appointment (taking 
only the identity of the nominator into account) seldom exceed 50%. There 
does not, based on this data, seem to be any one single nominator that gives 
their chosen candidate a better chance of being appointed than any other. 
Advocates Tokota and Gabriel have more successful ratios, but it is notable 
that they each made only five nominations, compared to the notably larger 
number of nominations made by the leading organisations, in particular 
the BLA and NADEL. Indeed, whilst regular individual nominators have a 
somewhat higher percentage of successful nominations than the equivalent 
organisations, the leading individual nominators have nominated significantly 
fewer candidates than the equivalent leading organisations (compare for 
instance Jappie J’s seven nominations to the BLA’s 65). It is conceivable that a 
smaller ratio of successful nominations is the inevitable result of nominating 
a large number of candidates. Thus, the numerical analysis provides limited 
support for the assumption that the identity of a candidate’s nominator is a 
strong predictor of their successful judicial appointment.
3 3  Analysis of substantive reasons given for nomination by the 
leading nominators, compared with transformative goals 
 In part 3 2, we noted that the leading nominating organisations are 
organisations established to address issues of transformation of the legal 
system. In order to examine whether their active role in nominating candidates 
for judicial appointment was indeed driven by transformative objectives, the 
five top nominating organisations were approached to provide feedback on 
the reasons for their nominations. They were also asked about the process for 
nominating candidates, their full membership component, and other relevant 
factors that could assist in our examination of the nominations we have 
highlighted.62 A questionnaire was forwarded to the relevant organisations 
which included questions about whether their constitution addresses the issue 
of transformation explicitly; what the membership of the organisation is; 
where the membership is drawn from; and what the organisational process 
for nominating judicial candidates is. Further, the organisations were asked 
62 This communication was conducted by our research assistant Rudo Chitapi, and later by Tabeth Masengu, 
by means of electronic and telephone communications between September and November 2016.
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about what qualities they look for when nominating candidates; who in the 
organisation is responsible for drafting the nominations; and whether they 
commented on other judicial candidates not drawn from their membership.63 
To date, only the BLA and SAC-IAWJ have responded, hence this section 
will discuss those two organisations in detail. Brief mention will be made 
of the other organisations who did not respond, but the analysis of their 
nominations will be as theorised by the authors. It must be noted that our 
aim is not to reach any conclusions concerning whether the organisations 
have sufficiently considered the full spectrum of judicial attributes, such as 
a candidate’s commitment to human rights or their competence as a judicial 
officer. We merely seek to examine whether there is prima facie evidence 
of the nominees matching the nominating requirements. Organisations were 
specifically selected for this section as opposed to individual nominators, 
because the former have a wider reach and often nominate a number of 
candidates in one sitting. Individual nominators often only nominate one 
candidate for a particular sitting of the JSC. 
As previously noted, the BLA’s Constitution specifically states that it 
supports a judiciary that is independent, transparent, accountable, non-sexist 
and non-racial.64 On its website, the BLA explains that the “organisation’s 
focus is that of empowering the black lawyer, however, the organisation is 
non-racial and membership is open to all those who believe in what it stands 
for”.65 The goal of empowering the black lawyer is evident from the numbers, 
with 63 of its 65 nominees being black.66 Only two of the nominees were 
white.
In reply to the question of what qualities the BLA looks for in a judge, 
the response highlighted academic qualifications, experience in practice, 
experience as a presiding officer,67 and a candidate’s professional conduct 
record with regulatory bodies. A detailed study of the nomination letters 
written by the BLA revealed that some nominations had detailed motivations 
as regards the suitability of a nominee for appointment, while others had 
none.68 Where motivation was provided, the BLA focused, in respect of 
leadership positions, on the nominees’ potential to ensure smooth running 
of the court and enhanced administration of justice. In respect of high 
court positions, the BLA focused on the nominees’ potential to contribute 
towards achieving access to justice for the poor and vulnerable.69 In some 
63 Questionnaire designed by the authors. 
64 Response to DGRU questionnaire completed by the President of the BLA, Mr Lutendo Sigogo, 15-09-
2015 (copy on file with authors).
65 See The Black Lawyers Association “About Us” (undated) BLA <http://www.blaonline.org.za/aboutus> 
(accessed 13-11-2016).
66 In South Africa, this refers to Africans, Indians and Coloureds who were all previously disadvantaged by 
Apartheid.
67 This could be experience in the Small Claims Court, in the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration, in the Magistracy, and in acting judge positions.
68 For instance, the nominations of Mokgere Masipa for the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Phatudi J for the 
Deputy Judge President’s position on the Limpopo High Court, Mr George Phatudi’s nomination for the 
Limpopo High Court, and Legodi J for the Supreme Court of Appeal, all in the April 2016 sitting of the 
JSC, had no detailed motivation for nomination.
69 All derived from an analysis of all the nomination letters in the authors’ possession.
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nominations, the BLA emphasised nominees’ sensitivity to access to justice 
and human rights protection, to the promotion of social justice, and to the duty 
to uphold the Constitution. Commitment to social justice and a concern for the 
poor, though not mentioned in the response to the questionnaire, are clearly 
a concern for the BLA. Therefore, it seeks to nominate people who espouse 
commitment to these ideals. It would seem that the BLA recognises that it is 
not enough to change the face of the judiciary and the legal profession without 
changing the conditions in which the majority of South Africans live. Hence, 
the organisation empowers black lawyers so that they in turn can empower 
the communities they serve in, as this too is part of the transformative agenda.
To shed light on the question of how the nomination process in the 
organisation works, the response from BLA was as follows:
“Branches nominate and recommend to the national executive committee which assess the nominees’ 
CVs. Branches are called to comment on nominations per province. The secretary and president talk 
to nominees on their candidature. Those who do not qualify are advised not to avail themselves.”70
It is interesting that candidates who do not qualify based on the qualities 
the organisation is looking for, are told not to avail themselves for judicial 
vacancies. Thus, it can be presumed from our data that the 65 candidates 
who the BLA did nominate had to pass this first hurdle within their own 
organisation, before passing the second hurdle of the JSC sifting committee. 
The importance of the internal BLA phase must be understood in context. It 
sifts out members who the organisation believes do not make the grade, thereby 
saving the candidate time and effort. However, it also means that if a candidate 
insists on finding another nominator and successfully makes it through the 
JSC sifting process they may face hard questions about why their organisation 
(the BLA) has not nominated them. The application form specifically asks if 
one is a member of a professional organisation, so going it alone would often 
spell doom for the candidate’s judicial aspirations. A redeeming quality may 
be that in exceptional circumstances, the BLA does nominate non-members, 
and sometimes even recommends them for appointment if they qualify.71
The SAC-IAWJ’s response to our survey was the most detailed. The 
organisation provided us with a copy of their Constitution and a sample of 
a nomination letter.72 The preamble specifically notes that women judicial 
officers are in a unique position to impact on the rights of the marginalised 
and underprivileged through the judicial system and to protect and empower 
women throughout the world.73 In section 1.4, the organisation lists its 
objectives, one of which is:
 “To assist women to participate meaningfully in the justice system in South Africa and to assist in the 
provision of public legal education and information programmes.”74 
70 Email response to DGRU questionnaire (copy on file with authors).
71 Email response to question whether the BLA provides the JSC with input on non-members (copy on file 
with authors).
72 Documents emailed to Rudo Chitapi on 9 September 2015.
73 Item (iii) of the Preamble of the SAC-IAWJ Constitution. 
74 S 1.4. 
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The organisation has a membership of 200, and while the majority are 
women, there are a few male judicial officers who subscribe to the objectives 
of the Chapter and who are members.75 Of the seventeen nominees included in 
our study, fifteen were past or present members and two were non-members. 
Only one nominee in the particular interviews under discussion was male, 
though they have nominated others.76 
The organisation does state that it would nominate a male candidate if he 
subscribes to the objectives of the Chapter. An example was the nomination 
of Mr T Maumela for the position of Judge of the Gauteng High Court at 
the JSC’s October 2011 sitting.77 The motivation to nominate Mr Maumela 
stemmed from his strong gender rights background and history of working 
with women’s organisations, delivering papers on gender-based violence, and 
facilitating equality training.78 However, the organisation is unapologetic 
about mostly nominating women.79 Not only does this approach assist women 
to participate in the judiciary, which is one of the SAC-IAWJ’s primary 
objectives, but it recognises that challenges existed and still do exist which 
place women on the back foot. Hence, the organisation takes the view that even 
if one could argue that its nominating procedure constitutes discrimination, it 
is fair discrimination.
Our analysis of the nomination letters reveals that the SAC-IAWJ has 
generally focused on nominees’ contributions in terms of human rights work, 
involvement in the governance of the legal profession, and commitment to 
transformation on the bench and in the profession, particularly commitment 
to the advancement of women. Unlike other nominators, which state the 
achievements and successes of nominees generally, the SAC-IAWJ has paid 
particular attention to the nominees’ track records in these identified areas. 
This approach in the SAC-IAWJ’s nomination letters is consistent with the 
organisation’s objectives and their constitutional values. It also underscores 
the belief that respect for human rights is a vital element of our new 
democracy, and that judges should clearly identify as those who have a history 
of advancing human rights on behalf of the vulnerable.
Finally, much like the BLA, when the SAC-IAWJ members desire 
nominations for judicial vacancies, they forward their details and CVs to the 
Executive. The SAC-IAWJ goes a step further than the BLA:
“In respect of senior positions where no member has requested a nomination the executive or at times 
senior members of the Chapter would advise on a particular candidate (female) to be considered 
and nominated, subject to their acceptance thereof. Time permitting, further inputs and comments 
are requested from members in the provinces, particularly those provinces where the candidate is 
situated. The relevant information would pertain to the candidate’s experience (judgements, sitting 
in boards, areas of interest, etc.), their community involvement, particularly on issues of women 
and transformation, any adverse information that may affect their suitability for appointment, etc. 
The only communication with potential candidates pertains to the receipt of the above-mentioned 
75 In response to our questionnaire completed by the SAC-IAWJ secretary, Vuyo Noncembu.
76 Lebotsang Bosielo J was nominated by the SAC-IAWJ for a vacancy on the Constitutional Court in 2016.
77 The SAC-IAWJ has also previously supported the nominations of Mr Mziwonke David Hinxa, the Chief 
Magistrate in the Free State, and Mr David Makhoba, a Regional Magistrate in Pretoria.
78 Details contained in nomination letter from the SAC-IAWJ.
79 In conversation with an anonymous judge who was a past member of the Executive Committee.
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information and the forwarding of the nomination letter. The executive makes the final decision on 
whether or not to nominate a candidate.”80
Our research has revealed that the SAC-IAWJ has not only recognised 
the paucity of women in leadership and apex court positions, but has taken 
practical steps to approach women candidates for nomination. For example, 
the organisation has previously approached former SAC-IAWJ presidents 
Mandisa Maya J and Connie Mocumie J to nominate them for positions on 
the Constitutional Court in June 2012 and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in April 2016, respectively.81 It has also nominated former member Leona 
Theron J for the Constitutional Court in July 2015 and April 2017, and current 
Deputy Judge President Patricia Goliath for the Western Cape Deputy Judge 
President’s position in April 2016. 
In the absence of a completed questionnaire from NADEL, AFT or SAWLA, 
the authors have two brief comments. First, in the NADEL nomination letters, 
there is a focus on the nominees’ commitment to protecting the rights of the 
poor, vulnerable and oppressed. In some nominations however, NADEL has 
not provided any motivation at all for the appointment of their nominees, 
other than restating the nominees’ academic qualifications and their records 
of positions held in the past.82 Second, unlike the SAC-IAWJ, SAWLA only 
nominates women.83 SAWLA has also generally focused on the candidate’s 
human rights record, any involvement in the governance of the legal 
profession, and the presence of a demonstrated commitment to transformation 
on the bench and in the profession. It goes without saying that a candidate’s 
contribution to the advancement of women has been a critical focus when 
nominating candidates. In regards to AFT, there is currently insufficient 
information available for a detailed analysis of their nominations.
4 The gendered dimension of nominations and appointments
It has been observed that gender equity on the bench remains a considerable 
challenge. This is the result of a number of factors, including, but not limited 
to, challenges women face in the legal profession, patriarchy, discrimination, 
and the attitude of the JSC towards women.84 Whilst the SAC-IAWJ has 
made efforts to ensure women participate meaningfully in the judiciary, 
some obstacles still exist for women with judicial aspirations. As mentioned 
earlier, the nomination process allows for different stakeholders to participate 
in the important procedure of judicial selection and affirm the expertise 
and competencies of their peers. This approach is not objectionable, but 
in this section, we seek to highlight how the process can also prove to be 
disadvantageous to women. 
80 Response to DGRU questionnaire (copy on file with authors).
81 Mocumie J was also nominated for the position of Free State Judge President in April and October 2014.
82 An example is the nomination of Mr Francis Kganyago for appointment to the Limpopo High Court in the 
April 2016 interviews.
83 Based on the data obtained for this survey.
84 See R Cowan “Women’s Representation on the Courts in the Republic of South Africa” (2006) 6 U Md 
LJ Race Relig Gender & Class 291; P Andrews “Commentary: The South African Judicial Appointment 
Process” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 565.
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Despite the inclusion of women in the legal profession in general, negative 
perceptions of women’s capabilities and competence still exist. Research has 
shown that perceptions of women’s capabilities not only prevent them from 
obtaining higher positions in the advocates profession, the attorneys profession 
and in the magistracy, but they also prevent them from acquiring good work 
experience.85 Mostly women of colour, with African women being the least 
acknowledged, face the perceptions of competency, or the lack thereof.86 For 
attorneys and advocates, the absence of experience in specialised areas of law 
and/or matters of significant weight, leaves a number of women seemingly not 
‘ready’ for judicial appointment.87 Similarly, a lack of exposure to complex 
commercial adjudication for many magistrates will be a hindrance to many 
women aspiring to higher judicial office. Thus, if you are a woman member 
of the BLA, for example, you will not get the nod from the organisation if you 
do not have the required experience that it believes is important for a judge to 
have (this is evidenced by the BLA’s procedure described above). So here, the 
power of a nomination, or the lack thereof, becomes crucial, as it determines 
whether an aspirant judge will get ‘one foot in the door’.
A second point to note regarding the gender dynamics of work experience, 
is that it would be plausible to assume that there would be less women 
available to nominate than there are men. Yet, if the SAC-IAWJ and SAWLA 
are excluded, of the other leading nominators, two others nominated more 
women than men. AFT and ARMSA both nominated seven women out of 
their ten candidates. Yet only 23% of the BLA nominees were women (15 out 
of 65), and only 29% of NADEL’s nominees were women (14 out of 49). One 
third of JOASA’s nominees were women (2 out of 6). If AFT and ARAMSA 
were able to nominate more women than men, this is a clear indication that 
there are qualified women available. However, the BLA, NADEL and JOASA 
could argue that despite the availability of qualified women, they are not 
represented enough in their membership: thus, they work with the candidates 
available.88 In the absence of gender disaggregated membership data from 
the four organisations, it would be difficult to assess whether this is true or 
whether these three organisations are failing their women members by mostly 
nominating men.89
A third issue of great significance is acting judicial appointments. Acting 
appointments are used when there is a vacancy in a court that is yet to be filled 
by the appointment of a permanent judge, or when a judge has gone on long 
leave. Section 175 (2) of the Constitution empowers the Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development to appoint acting judges after consulting 
85 See generally Masengu (2016) International Journal of the Legal Profession 305-319.
86 See 305-319; E Bonthuys “Gender and Race in South African Judicial Appointments” (2015) 23 Feminist 
Legal Studies 127-148. 
87 Such as constitutional law cases, marine law and mining law.
88 It has been said in JSC interviews that women are not always willing to be nominated and shy away from 
the process. However, men always make this comment.
89 The Commission for Gender Equality in its draft investigative report on “The Slow Pace of Gender 
Transformation in the Judiciary” has also noted the lack of disaggregated data from legal professional 
organisations. Draft Report issued in September 2015 (copy on file with authors).
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the senior judge of the court. Previously, the 1998 Mahomed guidelines90 
required candidates for judicial appointment to have, among other qualities, 
appropriate potential, so that intensive training could compensate for 
any lack of technical experience.91 In 2010, the JSC issued further criteria 
which retained experience and appropriate potential as requisite qualities.92 
However, potential alone is not enough. Acting experience has become a de 
facto requirement for permanent judicial appointment at the high court level. 
The JSC’s questionnaire for nominated candidates specifically asks candidates 
whether they have any acting experience, and requires them to state the period 
of time that they acted in a particular court.93 
Advocate Milton Seligson SC, a former member of the JSC who sat on 
the JSC’s sifting committee, has stated that in shortlisting candidates for 
appointment:
“[An] important requirement developed by the Commission is that an applicant must have acted as 
a judge in that court, and delivered a satisfactory level of performance, measured both qualitatively 
with reference to judgments delivered, and the comments of the permanent judges who have worked 
with the candidate, and in terms of the level of diligence displayed in producing judgments, and not 
having delayed unduly in handing down reserved judgments.”94
We do not dispute that acting experience gives one exposure to the quantity 
and quality of work one would undertake as a judge, and allows one to make 
an informed decision about whether the judicial career is worth pursuing. 
The challenge with acting appointments is the manner in which they are 
made. The process is opaque, with no existing uniform guidelines on how 
each court should go about selecting acting judges.95 We collated statistics 
of acting judicial appointments in the period 2008-2012 and 2014 in eighteen 
different types and divisions of courts.96 Only the Northern Cape High Court 
in Kimberley had a majority (64%) of women as acting judges. In all the 
others, less than 50% of the acting positions were held by women, including 
the Constitutional Court (20%) and Supreme Court of Appeal (25%), and most 
of the courts fell below 20%.97 In light of these figures, it is obvious that 
90 Drafted in 1998 under the leadership of Ismail Mahomed CJ (as he then was), these guidelines were 
an attempt by the JSC to supplement the criteria used in making judicial appointments (beyond those 
expressly listed in the Constitution). See Judicial Service Commission “Report on Activities of the 
Judicial Service Commission for the year ended 30 June 1999” (undated) Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development <www.justice.gov.za/reportfiles/1999reports/1999_judicial%20service%20
comm.htm> (accessed 22-11-2016).
91 Mahomed Guidelines, see Judicial Service Commission “Report on Activities” (undated) Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development.
92 For an analysis of these criteria, see C Albertyn “Judicial Diversity” in C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) 
The Judiciary in South Africa (2014) 245-87 281. For the 2010 criteria, see Judicial Service Commission 
“Summary of the criteria used by the Judicial Service Commission when considering candidates for 
judicial appointments” (2010) Constitutional Court <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/Admin/
Criteria-for-Judicial-appoinment.pdf> (accessed 01-05-2017).
93 Judicial Service Commission “Questionnaire for Candidates for Judicial Appointment” section 
2 question 9 (undated) Constitutional Court <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/Admin/
QUESTIONNAIRE-FOR-JUDICIAL-APPOINTMENT-OCTOBER-2010.pdf> (accessed 01-05-2017). 
94 Unpublished paper by Milton Seligson SC, 02-11-2009 (copy on file with authors).
95 For more detail on this see T Masengu & A Tilley “Is the Appointment of Acting Judges Transparent?” 
(2015) 553 De Rebus Lawyers Journal 24-26.
96 This includes the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, and large High Courts such as the 
Gauteng- and Western Cape division.
97 Statistics collated from information granted by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.
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women are less likely to be appointed as permanent judges, because they do 
not have acting experience, and are thus less likely to be nominated for judicial 
positions.98 Therefore, women are again handicapped even before they can be 
considered for nomination. 
Finally, though the numbers may not provide definitive evidence for the 
importance of the identity of a candidate’s nominator, there is nevertheless 
a sense in which the nominator’s identity does matter. While we make no 
inference as to a causal link between the nominators and the success of the 
nominees, we do know that particular nominators make a good impression 
on the JSC. For instance, we have noticed that many JSC commissioners are 
impressed when a candidate is nominated by a retired Constitutional Court 
justice, or well-respected advocate.99 Reach and influence will play a role in 
how a candidate is assessed, and given the current circumstances in the legal 
profession, women will frequently have less reach and influence than male 
candidates. There is evidence of this in our data, as we found that individual 
nominators nominated 240 men, but only 79 women, while the nominations 
by organisations did not have such a stark difference.100 
Women are more likely to be nominated by professional organisations than 
they are by individuals, but what happens if you are not part of an organisation? 
The absence of membership of a professional organisation can also be an 
Achilles heel, as experienced by Advocate Diane Davis, who was questioned 
by more than one commissioner over her lack of involvement in any of the 
organisations we have mentioned in this article.101 She was unsuccessful in 
two attempts to be appointed to the Western Cape High Court. While her 
lack of professional membership may have played no role at all in her case, 
it was clear in the interviews that she was frowned upon for being what one 
commissioner described as a “lone island”.102 Having observed subsequent 
interviews, the authors have realised that membership of any of the listed 
organisations is considered to be a means to prove that one is not only alive 
to the various challenges in South Africa, but that one seeks to identify with 
similar like-minded people and contribute to the broader transformative 
agenda.
5 Conclusion
The data obtained does not suggest that the identity of the nominator 
makes a significant difference to a candidate’s prospects of success. None 
of the organisations or individuals who regularly nominate candidates for 
appointment have a success rate of much more than 50%. This is, we would 
suggest, a generally positive sign for the judicial appointments process. It 
98 The exceptions to the “acting requirement” have been one appointment made to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and three to the Constitutional Court.
99 Noticed in Dhaya Pillay J’s interview for the Constitutional Court, when she was nominated by retired 
justice Zac Yacoob, and in the interviews of those nominated by Advocate Tokota.
100 130 men and 108 women were nominated by organisations, respectively.
101 Interview for a position on the Western Cape High Court in October 2013, held in Cape Town (no 
interview transcript available; Judges Matter only begun producing transcripts from 2015 onwards).
102 JSC interview of Diane Davis, 8 October 2013, held in Cape Town (no interview transcript available).
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suggests that the JSC does not abrogate its role in selection by effectively 
delegating decision-making to nominating organisations. This is probably 
a healthy situation. The JSC should avoid creating a situation in which 
membership of certain organisations, or favour with senior membership, is 
sought out solely for the purpose of career advancement. Some higher ratios 
of successful nominations were observed among individual nominators. 
However, as this result was drawn from a much smaller number of nominations 
compared to the leading organisations, it is difficult to draw too many 
conclusions from this. It was noted that as an aggregated group, both judges 
and advocates had a lower ratio of successful nominations than might have 
been expected. Whilst this may be seen as a healthy sign for the appointments 
process, for the reasons already described, it may also raise concerns that those 
who are at least theoretically best placed to gauge a candidate’s suitability for 
appointment to the bench, are not being heard as they should. 
The data and other aspects of this research do indicate, however, that 
the organised legal profession plays an important role in the appointments 
process. The BLA and NADEL, as leading organisations for previously 
disadvantaged lawyers, are playing their part in nominating candidates so 
as to level the playing field for candidates of colour. The data also shows that 
SAWLA, and particularly the SAC-IAWJ, take their role in transforming 
the judiciary seriously despite, or perhaps because of, the challenges faced 
by their members. The factors taken into account by these organisations in 
deciding to nominate candidates show that, while demographic transformation 
will always be important, there is recognition of a need to look at broader 
attributes, including leadership skills, and a commitment to human rights 
and social justice. In the past two years, we have been encouraged by the 
appointment of four women to leadership positions, including the appointment 
of South Africa’s first ever woman President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
Mandisa Maya J. We also acknowledge the increased number of women being 
appointed to the high court bench. However, there continues to be gender 
disparity in who gets nominated and who eventually becomes a permanent 
judge in South Africa.
SUMMARY
The South African system of judicial appointments includes an important, but easily overlooked, 
feature whereby prospective judges must be nominated for appointment. This article examines the 
nomination procedure, to assess the impact of nominations on the appointment process. 
The article deals with three central issues: whether the identity of the nominator impacts on a 
candidate’s chances of appointment; the attention given by nominating organisations to the need 
for demographic transformation of the judiciary when making nominations and what other factors 
influence a decision to nominate; and the gendered nature of nominations and judicial appointment 
in general.
It is argued that in terms of numbers, the identity of a nominator does not appear to make a 
significant difference to a candidate’s prospects of appointment. Contrary to what might have been 
expected, the “success rates” of judges and advocates who nominate candidates is collectively 
relatively low. However, it is argued that the identity of a nominator is nevertheless important in 
other respects, such as the perceived prestige of the nominator. Furthermore, candidates who are not 
involved in significant legal professional organisations may be disadvantaged.
The article further surveys the reasons for nominations given by leading nominators, as well as 
the process followed in making nominations, and assess these in light of transformative goals. The 
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organisations surveyed appear closely attuned to these goals. The article concludes with a discussion 
of the challenges facing the quest for gender equality in the judiciary, such as perceptions of lack 
of competence and a lack of quality work that often bedevil women lawyers, which impact on the 
likelihood of female candidates being nominated for judicial appointment. The importance of acting 
as a judge, and the relative lack of opportunities provided for women to do so, is also discussed. A 
failure by some leading organisations to nominate female candidates regularly is also noted.
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